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Abstract
Whereas deterministic protocols are typically guaranteed to obtain particular goals of interest,
probabilistic protocols typically provide only probabilistic guarantees. This paper initiates an investi-
gation of the interdependence between actions and subjective beliefs of agents in a probabilistic setting.
In particular, we study what probabilistic beliefs an agent should have when performing actions, in a
protocol that satisfies a probabilistic constraint of the form: Condition ϕ should hold with probability at
least p when action α is performed. Our main result is that the expected degree of an agent’s belief in ϕ
when it performs α equals the probability that ϕ holds when α is performed. Indeed, if the threshold
of the probabilistic constraint should hold with probability p = 1− ε2 for some small value of ε then,
with probability 1− ε, when the agent acts it will assign a probabilistic belief no smaller than 1− ε
to the possibility that ϕ holds. In other words, viewing strong belief as, intuitively, approximate
knowledge, the agent must probably approximately know (PAK-know) that ϕ is true when it acts.
1 Introduction
One of the defining features of distributed and multi-agent systems is that an agent’s actions can only
depend on its local information. While this local information cannot typically contain a complete
description of the state of the system, it must still be sufficiently rich to support the actions that the agent
takes. Thus, for example, in runs of a mutual exclusion (ME) protocol, an agent that enters the critical
section must know (based on its local state) that no other agent is in the critical section (cf. [15, 13]).
In probabilistic protocols, or even in deterministic protocols that operate in a probabilistic setting, the
constraints on actions are often specified in probabilistic, rather than absolute, terms. One could, for
example, consider a probabilistic requirement stating that upon entry to the critical section, it should be
empty with very high probability, rather than in all cases. In this case, the connection between an agent’s
actions and its local information is apparently not as tight. This paper initiates an investigation of the
connection between the two in protocols that satisfy probabilistic constraints. The following example
provides a taste of the subject matter and will serve us to discuss some of the issues involved:
Example 1. We are given a synchronous message-passing system with two agents, Alice and Bob. At
any given round, each agent can send messages to the other, and can either perform a “firing” action
(fireA and fireB) or skip. Communication between them is unreliable, with every message sent being lost
with probability 0.1, and being delivered in the round in which it is sent with probability 0.9. No message
is delivered late, and probabilities for different messages are independent. Both agents begin operation
at time 0, and Alice is assumed to have a binary variable “go” in her initial state, whose value is 0 with
probability 0.5, and is 1 otherwise. Given the unreliability of communication, it is not possible to ensure
that both agents will always fire simultaneously. Instead, we consider the relaxed firing squad problem,
in which they do so with high probability:
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Spec: If go = 0 then neither agent ever fires; while
if go = 1 they should attempt to coordinate a joint firing. In particular,
The probability that both agents fire, given that Alice is firing, should be at least 0.95.
Now consider the following protocol, FS, in which, when go = 1 Alice sends two messages to Bob in the
first round, and fires at time 2 (in the third round). When go = 0 she sends no messages and never
fires. Bob acts as follows: If he receives at least one message from Alice in the first round, he sends her
a ‘Yes’ message in the second round and fires in the third. If, however, he receives no message in the
first round, then he sends Alice a ‘No’ message in the second round and never fires.
It is easy to verify that FS satisfies Spec. The agents never fire when go = 0, and if go = 1 then
Alice fires with probability 1 at time 2, and they both fire at time 2 with probability 0.99 ≥ 0.95, as desired.
Observe, however, that in a run of FS in which go = 1, both of Alice’s messages are lost, and Bob’s ‘No’
message is delivered to Alice, she fires at time 2 despite being absolutely certain that Bob is not firing.
The FS protocol in this example shows that in a probabilistic protocol that succeeds with high probability,
agents are not always required to act only when they believe that their actions will succeed.1 
Note that Alice can have three different states of information when she fires in FS, corresponding
to whether she received a ‘Yes’ message in the second round, she received a ‘No’ message, or received
no message from Bob. In the latter case, Alice knows that Bob’s message was lost, but is unsure about
what he sent. Roughly speaking, in this case Alice ascribes a probability of .99 to the event that Bob
is firing, since that is the probability that he received at least one of her messages. If Alice received a
‘Yes’ message, then she knows for certain that Bob is firing when she fires, while if she received a ‘No’
message, she is certain that Bob is not firing.
The connection between knowledge and actions that we discussed at the outset applies very broadly
and is not specific to mutual exclusion. Indeed, recent work has shown that it holds generally in distributed
systems, for deterministic actions and deterministic goals [30]. More precisely, a theorem called the Knowl-
edge of Preconditions Principle (or KoP, for short) establishes that if some property ϕ (e.g., “no agent is in
the critical section”) is a necessary condition for performing an action α, then an agent must know that ϕ
holds when it performs α. This is a universal theorem, which applies in all systems, for all actions and
conditions, provided that the action is deterministic and that the condition must surely hold whenever the
action is performed. Explicit use of the KoP has facilitated the design of efficient protocols for various prob-
lems [10, 11, 22], which improved on the previously best known solutions, sometimes by a significant margin.
This paper seeks to generalize the KoP to probabilistic distributed systems, where both protocols and
guarantees may be probabilistic. Probabilistic distributed systems are of interest in a wide range of settings.
Probabilistic protocols are used to facilitate symmetry breaking, load balancing and fault-tolerance
[9, 19, 1, 36, 27, 7, 12]. Participants in interactive proofs, and more generally in cryptography, typically
follow probabilistic protocols [6, 21]. Similarly, in many competitive settings such as games, auctions
and economic settings, agents follow probabilistic strategies that give rise to probabilistic systems (see,
e.g., [32]). Often, distributed protocols operate in a context in which the environment (or scheduler)
is probabilistic, as in the case of population protocols and many network protocols [4, 26, 8]. Roughly
speaking, a distributed system is probabilistic2 if the protocol, the environment, or both, are probabilistic.
Distributed biological systems such as ant colonies, the brain, and many more, are often best modelled in
probabilistic terms [31, 14, 3, 2, 18]. Since probabilistic systems are ubiquitous, a good understanding of the
interaction between action and information in such systems may provide useful insight into such systems.
1Our example is based on one due to Halpern and Tuttle in [24], in which the same behavior appears. We do not suggest
that the protocol FS is the most sensible solution to the problem; it is presented here for the sake of analysis.
2Technical terms such as a probabilistic distributed system, knowledge, probability and probabilistic beliefs are used
loosely in the introduction; all relevant notions are formally defined in the later sections.
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Specifications of deterministic protocols in non-probabilistic systems typically require them to satisfy a
set of definite constraints, which must be satisfied in all executions. E.g., all runs of a consensus protocol
must satisfy Decision, Validity and Agreement [28]. Similarly, all runs of a mutual exclusion protocol
must satisfy the exclusion property at all times. For probabilistic systems, correctness may be specified
in several ways. In some cases, specifications are definite, and probability is only used to break symmetry
or affect the probability or timing of reaching a desired goal. This is the case, for example, for Agreement
in Ben-Or’s consensus protocol [9], or in the mutual exclusion protocols considered in [33]. In other
cases, however, the protocol is required to succeed with high probability. This is the case, for example,
in interactive proofs [21, 6], as well as in several well-known consensus protocols (e.g., [34, 19]) in which
disagreement can occur. Of course, it is similarly possible to relax the correctness of ME protocols, by
requiring that the probability of the exclusion property failing should be small. Indeed, in the setting of
Example 1, no protocol can coordinate attacks and ensure that no agent will ever attack alone. We remark
that in a related setting agents may be required to act only if they strongly believe that their actions will
succeed. Namely, a judge is required to find a defendant guilty only if she believes him to be guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Taking a probabilistic interpretation, we may take this to mean that a guilty verdict
is allowed only if the judge very strongly believes in the defendant’s guilt [37]. (Interestingly, in civil cases
in the UK, the requirement for a judgement is that fault be proved on a “balance of probabilities” [35].
This means, roughly speaking, that one scenario is believed to be more likely than its converse.)
Given the probabilistic nature of events in a probabilistic system, in addition to knowledge that
certain events hold in an execution, an agent may have probabilistic beliefs about relevant facts. Very
roughly speaking (and informally for now), let us denote by βi(ϕ) agent i’s degree of belief that a given
fact ϕ holds. In the protocol FS, for example, if Alice receives a ‘Yes’ message from Bob at time 2, then
βA(fireB) = 1 (where βA stands for Alice’s belief and fireB stands for “Bob is firing”), while βA(fireB) = 0
if she receives the message ‘No’. In case Bob’s message is lost, and so she receives neither, Alice is unsure
whether Bob is firing, but her degree of belief in it is high (indeed, βA(fireB) = 0.99 in this case).
Our investigation will be most closely related to probabilistic guarantees in which protocols are
required to succeed with high probability. Motivated by, e.g., the relaxed firing squad problem and
relaxing mutual exclusion, we are interested in guarantees that a certain condition (or fact) ϕ should
be true with high probability, when (or given that) a particular action α is performed. We will call such
a requirement, which we informally denote by µ(ϕ |α) ≥ p, a probabilistic constraint for a protocol.
In Example 1 the probabilistic constraint can be expressed by µ(ϕboth |fireA) ≥ 0.95, where ϕboth is the
fact that both agents are currently firing, and fireA is the fact that Alice is firing.
We think of the value p in a probabilistic constraint of the form µ(ϕ |α) ≥ p as the desired threshold
probability that the solution should achieve. It is natural to think of an agent’s beliefs as meeting the
threshold of the probabilistic constraint µ(ϕ |α) ≥ p at a point where i performs α in a given execution if
βi(ϕ) ≥ p at that point. We are interested in studying the interaction between probabilistic constraints
on an agent’s actions, and her probabilistic beliefs when acting. In Example 1, the FS protocol satisfies
the probabilistic constraint, even though the threshold is not always met when Alice fires. We notice,
however, that this happens infrequently—Alice fires without her beliefs meeting the threshold only with a
probability of 0.009 = 0.1 ·0.1 ·0.9. In a measure 0.991 of the runs in which Alice fires, the threshold is met
when she fires. We remark that 0.991 ≥ 0.95. Is this a coincidence, or can we prove that the threshold
must be met whp? In addition to analyzing the necessary conditions on beliefs for satisfying a probabilistic
constraint, we are interested in sufficient conditions. It is natural to conjecture that always meeting the
threshold is a sufficient condition for satisfying a probabilistic constrain. Is that indeed the case?
Our investigation will be made with respect to a class of probabilistic systems that satisfy several
simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the answers that it provides will offer new insights into the con-
nection between actions and probabilistic beliefs. In particular, we will consider finite purely probabilistic
systems (pps for short).
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The main contributions of this paper are:
• We initiate a systematic study of the connection between actions and probabilistic beliefs for a wide
range of probabilistic protocols, and for general conditions ϕ. In particular, we consider beliefs when
agents perform mixed actions, in which, e.g., a concrete action α is performed only with a certain
probability. Modeling, formulating, and proving these connections is a subtle matter.
• We first consider sufficient conditions on beliefs for ensuring that a probabilistic constraint is satisfied.
Perhaps unexpectedly, always meeting the threshold is not, in general, a sufficient condition. It may
fail to be sufficient when agents perform mixed actions (i.e., the choice of action at a point is a
probabilistic function of the local state). But all is not lost. We identify an independence condition of
the condition ϕ from the action α, under which it is shown to be sufficient. Moreover, the independence
condition appears to hold in most cases of practical interest.
• It is shown that the threshold need not be met whp for a probabilistic constraint to be satisfied. In
particular, we prove that there is no positive lower bound ε > 0 on the measure of runs in which
the threshold must be met when α is performed in order for a probabilistic constraint to be satisfied.
• We show that the expected value of the degree of belief plays a central role in establishing the proba-
bilistic constraints. Our main theorem is that if ϕ and α satisfy the independence property mentioned
above, then the expected value of βi(ϕ)@α in the system is equal to µ(ϕ |α).
• As a corollary of this theorem, we can prove that in order to satisfy a probabilistic constraint, an agent
must, with high probability, strongly believe that the condition holds when it acts. More formally,
suppose that µ(ϕ |α) = 1− ε2 for some ε ∈ [0,1]. Then βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε in probabilistic measure
at least 1 − ε of the runs in which i performs α. Of course, if 1 > ε > 0 then 1 − ε is smaller
than the constraint’s threshold of 1− ε2. However, if ε is small, this means that i must probably
approximately know that ϕ holds when it performs α.
The 1980’s saw the emergence of formal models of knowledge and beliefs in distributed systems.
A thorough presentation elucidating a variety of subtle aspects involved in modeling and reasoning
about probabilistic beliefs appears in [23]. While Fagin and Halpern [16] presented a general model in
which agents’ probabilistic beliefs can be expressed, our presentation is most closely related to [20, 24].
Following [20], we model a probabilistic system in terms of a synchronous execution tree whose edges
are labeled by transition probabilities. In [20], Fischer and Zuck state that if a deterministic protocol for
coordinated attack guarantees that an attack is coordinated with probability p, then the “average” belief
of A in the fact that B is attacking, when it attacks, is at least p. A closer reading of [20] reveals that
this property of the average belief is precisely the probabilistic constraint that A must, with probability at
least p, believe that both are attacking when A attacks. We take the investigation one step further, and
characterize what A’s beliefs need to satisfy in order to ensure that such a constraint is satisfied. Moreover,
while they consider two concrete examples and deterministic protocols, we investigate arbitrary probabilistic
constraints, in a setting that allows for general probabilistic protocols. Halpern and Tuttle consider several
different notions of probabilistic beliefs, and show that they correspond to different modelling assumptions.
They relate probabilistic beliefs to notions of safe bets, and discuss how coordinated attack is related
to different notions of belief and to probabilistic common belief. Our notion of probabilistic beliefs is
what [24] refer to as Ppost, or the agent’s posterior beliefs obtained by conditioning on her local state.
Reasoning about agents’ probabilistic beliefs is well established in game theory [5, 32, 29]. In this
literature, agents are typically assumed to possess a common prior, which is a central property of the
purely probabilistic systems that we consider. Their models are normally based on a fixed universe of
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states of the world, in which actions are not explicitly modeled. Fagin and Halpern [16] as well as Monderer
and Samet [29] present a novel notion of probabilistic common beliefs and discuss its applicability.
This paper is organized as follows. The following two sections present our model of probabilistic
systems, and the notion of subjective probabilistic beliefs. Analyzing probabilistic constraints of the form
described above, Section 4 shows that under a certain independence assumption, meeting the threshold of
a probabilistic constraint (i.e., holding a strong belief) is a sufficient condition for satisfying it. Section 5
shows that the threshold must at least sometimes be met, but there is no lower bound on the measure
of runs in which it must be met. Section 6 presents our main result, proving that in order to satisfy a
probabilistic constraint, the agent should, in expectation, hold a strong belief. Finally, Section 7 shows
that in order to satisfy a probabilistic constraint an agent should hold a strong belief with high probability.
The Appendix contains proofs of all formal statements in the paper.
2 Model and Preliminary Definitions
Reasoning about knowledge, beliefs, and probability in distributed systems can be rather subtle, and it has
received extensive treatment in the literature over the last four decades. The foundations of our modeling of
distributed systems are based on the interpreted systems framework of [17], and the modeling of probability
and probabilistic beliefs in distributed systems is based on [20, 23, 24]. An important issue that arises
when considering probabilistic beliefs (as discussed extensively in [20, 24]) has to do with the interaction
between nondeterministic choices and probabilistic beliefs. For example, consider a model that differs from
that of Example 1 only in that the value of Alice’s local variable go is set nondeterministically, rather than
probabilistically. In a run of the protocol FS in that model in which Bob does not receive any message at
time 1, what can we say about Bob’s beliefs at time 2 regarding whether Alice is firing? Roughly speaking,
fireA is not a measurable event for Bob at that point, because we have made no probabilistic assumptions
about whether A’s flag is initially in the go = 1 or the go = 0 state. We can think of the state of the
flag as being a nondeterministic choice made by the scheduler3 before time 0. Similar issues regarding
measurability arise with other nondeterministic actions by the scheduler or by the agents. In a probabilistic
protocol for consensus, for example, it is typically assumed that the scheduler can freely determine who
the faulty agents are, and how they act. As pointed out by Pnueli [33] and discussed by [20, 23, 24], the
way to formally handle reasoning about probabilities in the presence of nondeterminism is to consider
as fixed the set of all nondeterministic choices in an execution. Halpern and Tuttle in [24] consider fixing
such a set as determining a particular “adversary.” In particular, an adversary can determine a unique
initial global state or, more generally, a distribution over initial states. Once we fix the adversary, all
choices, whether those by the scheduler or those by the agents, are purely probabilistic. We will study
the relation between actions and probabilistic beliefs when a protocol is executed in the context of a fixed
adversary. In this case, the set of runs of the protocol can be modeled as a tree; we proceed as follows.
2.1 Probabilistic Systems
We assume a set Ags = {1,2, . . . , n} of n agents, and a scheduler, denoted by e, which we call the
environment. A global state is a tuple of the form g = (`e, `1, `2, . . . , `n) associating a local state `i with
every agent i and a state `e with the environment. We model a purely probabilistic system (pps) by a
finite labelled directed tree of the form T = (V,E,pi), where pi : E → (0,1] assigns a probability to each
edge of T . In particular,
∑
w∈V
pi(v,w) = 1 holds for every internal node v of T . All nodes of T other
than its root correspond to global states. The root is denoted by λ, and its sole purpose is to define a
distribution over its children, which represent initial global states. Every path from one of the root’s
3The scheduler can be thought of as being “Nature” or “the environment;” we use the terms interchangeably.
5
children to a leaf is considered a run of T , and we denote by RT the set of runs of T . A run is thus a
finite sequence of global states. We denote the initial global state of a run r ∈ RT (which is a child of the
root λ in T) by r(0) and its k+ 1st global state by r(k). Agent i’s local state at the global state r(t) is
denoted by ri(t). We shall restrict attention to synchronous systems, meaning that the agents have access
to the current time. Formally, we assume that every local state of agent i contains a variable timei, and
whenever `i = ri(t) in T the value of timei in `i equals t. Intuitively, this guarantees that every agent
will always know what the current time is. (We restrict attention to synchronous systems, since modeling
probabilistic beliefs in asynchronous systems is nontrivial, as discussed in [23, 24].)
Formally, a pps T induces a probability space XT = (RT ,2RT , µT ) over the runs of T . (This
is commonly called a prior probability distribution over the set of runs.) The probability distribu-
tion µ = µT is defined as follows. For a run r = v0, v1, . . . , vk, we write µ(r) instead of µ({r}), and define
µ(r) = pi(λ, v0) · pi(v0, v1) · · ·pi(vk−1, vk). Thus, the probability of a run is the product of the probability
of its initial global state and the transition probabilities along its edges. Based on our assumptions
regarding T , it is easy to verify that XT is a probability space. Since RT is finite and every run of RT
is measurable, every subset Q ⊆ RT is measurable, and µ(Q) =
∑
r∈Q
µ(r).
2.2 Relating Protocols to Probabilistic Systems
Let i ∈ Ags ∪ {e} denote an agent or the environment. Denote by Li the set of i’s local states, and
by Acti the set of local actions it performs in a given protocol of interest. For simplicity, we assume that
the sets Acti are disjoint. A (probabilistic) protocol for i is a function Pi : Li → ∆(Acti) mapping
each local state `i ∈ Li to a distribution over Acti. This distribution determines the probabilities by
which i’s action at `i is chosen. We assume that Pi(`i) assigns positive probability to a finite subset of
Acti for every `i ∈ Li. When Pi(`i) assigns positive probability to more than one action, we say that the
agent is performing a mixed action step, using the language of game theorists [32]. The probabilistic
choice in this case is made based on the local state `i, and when the agent decides on the mixed step
she does not know which of the actions in its support will actually be performed.
A joint protocol is a tuple P = (Pe, P1, . . . , Pn). We will restrict attention to systems T in which,
at every non-final point (i.e., a point that does not correspond to a leaf in the tree), the environment and
each of the agents perform an action. Every tuple of actions performed at a global state g determines
a unique successor state g′ as well as the probability pi(g, g′) of transition from g to g′.
Given a probability distribution over the finite set of initial global states, if the environment and all
agents follow probabilistic protocols that terminate in bounded time as above, then the set of runs of
the system can be modeled by a pps T . Indeed, since we assume that the support of Pi(`i) is finite in
all cases, the number of successors of a global state g in runs of such a joint protocol P is finite. In the
setting of Example 1, since we are given a fixed probability of 0.5 that go = 0 in the initial global state,
and a probability of 0.5 that go = 1, the set of runs of the protocol FS can be represented by a pps. (If
the value of go were set nondeterministically, then the initial global state with go = 0 would define a
pps, and the one with go = 1 would define another, seperate, pps; see [23, 24].)
In the sequel, we will need to keep track of what actions are performed in any given state by the
various agents and by the environment. To this end, we will assume w.l.o.g. that at every global state
the environment’s local state `e contains a “history” component h that is a list of all actions performed
so far, when each action was performed, and by which agent.
2.3 Facts in Probabilistic Systems
Due to space limitations, we will not present a formal logic for reasoning about uncertainty in distributed
systems (for this, the reader should consult [23]). Rather, we will cover just enough of the definitions
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to justify our investigation.
We are interested in reasoning about conditions and facts such as whether agents perform par-
ticular actions, what agents’ initial values were, etc. While some of these are properties of the run,
others (e.g., “the critical section is empty”) are transient, in the sense that they refer to the state of
affairs at the current time, and their truth value can change from one time to another. Therefore,
we will consider the truth of facts at points (r, t), which refer to time t in a run r. We denote by
Pts(T) = {(r, t) : r ∈ RT and r(t) is a node of T} the set of points of a pps T .
A fact (or event) over a pps T is identified with a subset of Pts(T) which, intuitively, is the set of
points at which the fact is true. We write (T, r, t) |= ϕ to denote that ϕ is true at the point (r, t) of
the system T . For example, we will later use the fact doesi(α) stating that i is currently performing α.
Formally, we define (T, r, t) |= doesi(α) to hold iff the history component h of actions in re(t+ 1) records
that i performed α at time t. In a similar fashion, we write (T, r, t) |= ¬ϕ to denote that a fact ϕ is not
true at the point (r, t) of the system T .
In some cases, we are interested in facts ψ that are properties of the run, such as “all agents decide
on the same value.” Formally, we say that a fact ψ is a fact about runs in the system T if for all r ∈ RT
and all times t, t′ ≥ 0 it is the case that (T, r, t) |= ψ iff (T, r, t′) |= ψ. For facts ψ about runs, we write
(T, r) |= ψ to state that ψ is true in the run r of the system T .
Intuitively, for a transient fact ϕ, the fact “ϕ holds at some point in the current run” is a fact about runs.
On several occasions, we will be interested in run-based facts of this type. In particular, for an action α ∈
Acti and for a local state `i ∈ Li, we will use α and `i to denote facts about runs defined as follows:
(T, r) |= α iff (T, r, t) |= doesi(α) holds for some time t .
(T, r) |= `i iff ri(t) = `i for some time t .
3 Probabilistic Beliefs
An event in the probability space XT consists of a set Q ⊆ RT of runs. Since we can view a fact θ about
runs as corresponding to the set of runs that satisfy θ, we will often abuse notation slightly and treat
facts about runs as representing events. We will thus be able to consider the probabilities of such facts,
and as well as to condition events on facts about runs.
As is common in the analysis of distributed systems using knowledge theory, we identify the local
information available to i at a given point with its local state there (see [17]). In the current setting, in
order to capture probabilistic beliefs, we associate with every local state `i ∈ Li in T the probability space
X `i = (RT ,2RT , µT (· | `i)). Considering the probability measure µT induced by T as a prior probability
measure on sets of runs, the assignment µT (· | `i) captures agent i’s subjective posterior probability.
Recall that, by definition, pi assigns positive probabilities to all transitions in a pps T . Consequently,
µT (r) > 0 for every run r ∈ RT , and hence µT (`i) > 0 for every local state `i that appears in T . It
follows that µT (Q | `i) is well-defined for every set of runs Q ⊆ RT .
Our investigation of beliefs in the context of probabilistic constraints will focus on whether (possibly
transient) facts of interest hold when an agent acts, or when the agent is in a given local state. Since the
current time is always a component of an agent’s local state in a pps, a given local state `i can appear at
most once in any particular run r. This facilitates the following notation. We write ϕ@`i, for a state `i ∈ Li,
to state that ϕ holds when i is in local state `i in the current run. Formally, we define (T, r) |= ϕ@`i iff
both (T, r) |= `i (the local state occurs in r), and (T, r, t) |= ϕ holds for the point (r, t) at which ri(t) = `i.
We can now define an agent i’s degree of probabilistic belief in a fact ϕ at a given point as follows:
Definition 3.1. The value of βi(ϕ) at (r, t) ∈ Pts(T) is defined to be µT (ϕ@`i | `i), where `i = ri(t).
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The value of βi(ϕ) represents i’s current degree of belief that ϕ is true. It depends on i’s local state,
and changes over time as the local state changes.
3.1 Proper Actions
Recall that probabilistic constraints impose restrictions on the conditions under which an action can be
performed. In some cases, these are conditions are facts about the the run (e.g., “all processes decide 0
in the current run” or “all initial values were 1”), and in other cases they may be transient facts such
as “the critical section is currently empty”. Transient facts do not, in general correspond to measurable
events in our probability space XT . To overcome this difficulty we will restrict our attention to actions
that are performed at most once in any given execution of the protocol. We proceed as follows:
We say that α is a proper action for i in T if i performs α at least once in T and, for every
run r ∈ RT , agent i performs α at most once in r. For a proper action α, the set of runs in which α
is performed is well-defined. Moreover, in such a run, the time, as well as the local state, at which α
is performed are unique. Technically, restricting actions to be proper will enable us to partition the set
of runs in which an action α is performed according to the local state at which i performs α.
Our analysis will focus on an agent’s beliefs when it performs a proper action. Restricting attention to
proper actions does not impose a significant loss of generality. Either tagging an action with its occurrence
index (e.g., “the third time i performs α”) or timestamping actions with the time at which they are per-
formed (“the action α performed by i at time t”), can be used to convert any given action into a proper one.
For a proper action α ∈ Acti, we take ϕ@α to be a fact stating that ϕ holds in the current run when i
performs α. Since α is proper, this is a fact about runs. Formally, we define (T, r) |= ϕ@α to hold iff
both (T, r) |= α (i.e., α is performed in the current run r) and (T, r, t) |= ϕ holds for the (single) point
(r, t) of r at which (T, r, t) |= doesi(α).
Since we are interested in i’s beliefs when she performs an action, we will similarly use βi(ϕ)@α
to refer to i’s degree of belief in ϕ when it performs α. Formally, we define
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r] to be the
value of βi(ϕ) at the point (r, t) at which (T, r, t) |= doesi(α). By convention, if i does not perform α
in r, then
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r] = 0 for every fact ϕ.
Definition 3.2. A probabilistic constraint on an action α in a pps T is a statement of the form
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p .
For a fact ψ about runs, the form of a probabilistic constraint becomes much simpler. In this case,
(T, r, t) |= ψ@α iff both (T, r) |= ψ and (T, r) |= α hold. Since µT (r
∣∣α) = 0 for every run r at which α
is not performed by i, the constraint becomes simply µT (ψ
∣∣α) ≥ p, since µT (ψ@α ∣∣α) = µT (ψ ∣∣α).
We are now ready to start our formal investigation.
4 The Sufficiency of Meeting the Threshold
Intuitively, acting only under strong beliefs should suffice for guaranteeing probabilistic constraints.
Namely, we would expect that for every proper action α of i and fact ϕ, if βi(ϕ) ≥ p holds whenever i
performs α in T , then µT (ϕ@α |α) ≥ p (i.e., if i performs α only when its belief in ϕ meets the threshold
of a given constraint, then the constraint will be satisfied). This is indeed true in many cases of interest.
Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, it is not true in general. For an example in which it fails, consider
the system T depicted in Figure 1 in which there is a single agent, called i, and a single initial global
state g0. At time 0 the agent i performs either α or α
′, each with probability 12 . The resulting pps T
contains two runs, r in which i performs α, and r′ in which it performs α′ 6= α. Let the fact of interest
be ψ = ¬doesi(α). It is easy to check that µT (ψ@α
∣∣α) = 0, since by definition, α is performed precisely
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whenever ψ is false. As far as i’s beliefs are concerned, βi(ψ) =
1
2 when i performs α, since i’s local state
at the initial global state g0 guarantees with probability
1
2 that α will not be performed. We thus have
that βi(ψ) ≥ 12 whenever i performs α in T , while µT (ψ@α |α) = 0 < 12 .
  
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Figure 1: An example of a pps T .
In this example, the condition ψ = ¬doesi(α) of interest depends strongly on whether the action α is
performed. This is unlikely to be the case in typical probabilistic constraints. We remark, however, that
the claim can be shown to fail in more natural scenarios, such as when the action α consists of sending
a particular message and ψ depends on whether its recipient acts in a particular way in a future round.
The problem arises from the dependence between ϕ and doesi(α). We now present an independence
assumption that holds in many cases of interest, under which the desired property holds.
Definition 4.1. Let α be a proper action for agent i in T . We say that ϕ is local-state independent
of α in T if, for all `i ∈ Li it is the case that
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣`i) = µT([ϕ∧ α]@`i ∣∣`i) .
Intuitively, local-state independence implies that the probability that ϕ will hold when agent i
performs the action α is independent of the local state at which α is performed. We can now show:
Theorem 4.2. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let ϕ be a fact that is local-state
independent of α in T . If βi(ϕ) ≥ p at every point of T at which i performs α, then µT (ϕ@α |α) ≥ p.
Proof sketch. We partition the event Rα consisting of the runs of RT in which α is performed according
to i’s local state `i when it performs α. Using ϕ’s local-state independence of α in T we show that, in
every cell of the partition, ϕ holds with probability at least p when α is performed. The claim then
follows by the law of total probability.
Theorem 4.2 can be viewed as following from the Jeffrey conditionalization theorem in probability [25].
Roughly speaking, Jeffrey conditionalization relates the prior probability of an event when an experiment
is performed, to its posterior probabilities given the possible outcomes of the experiment. As discussed in
Section 3, and agent’s probabilistic beliefs coincide with the posterior probability, obtained by conditioning
µT on the realized local state. Jeffrey conditionalization is also the basis of our main theorem, and
we discuss it in slightly greater detail in Section 6.1. As a statement about prior probabilities and
probabilistic beliefs, Theorem 4.2 generalizes a result that Samet and Monderer [29] proved in a simpler
setting. They considered a model that corresponds to a static system in which performing actions is
not explicitly modeled. In our formalism, this would correspond to a “flat” pps T consisting only of a
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root node and its children (corresponding to initial states). They showed that in such a system, if an
agent’s expected degree of (posterior) belief regarding a fact ϕ is greater or equal to a value p, then the
objective (prior) probability of ϕ is, in itself, at least p.
While the local-state independence property of Theorem 4.1 is needed for our proof of Theorem 4.2,
the theorem still applies in many (perhaps most) cases of interest. One case in which the problem does not
arise is if α never participates in a mixed action step. More formally, α ∈ Acti is called a deterministic
action for i in a pps T if doesi(α) is a deterministic function of i’s local state in T . I.e., if ri(t) = r
′
i(t)
for two points (r, t), (r′, t) ∈ Pts(T), then i either performs α at both points, or does so at neither of
them. Even for actions that participate in mixed action steps, local-state independence is guaranteed in
many typical cases. We say that two runs r, r′ ∈ RT agree up to time t if they share the same prefix
up to and including time t. (I.e., if they extend the same time t node in T .) We call ϕ a past-based fact
in T if, for all pairs r, r′ ∈ RT of runs and times t ≥ 0, if r and r′ agree up to time t, then (T, r, t) |= ϕ
exactly if (T, r′, t) |= ϕ. Many reasonable conditions, including any fact about the current state of the
system such as “A is attacking”, or “the critical section is empty,” are past based. Sufficient conditions
for local-state independence are given by:
Lemma 4.3. Let α ∈ Acti be a proper action in a pps T , and let ϕ be a fact over T . If (a) α is
deterministic in T , or (b) ϕ is past-based in T , then ϕ is local-state independent of α in T .
5 On the Necessity of Meeting the Threshold
Recall from protocol FS that it is possible to satisfy the probabilistic specification of the relaxed firing
squad problem, while allowing actions to be performed even in cases in which the probabilistic property
of interest is not strongly believed (indeed, the example shows that it might not be believed at all in
some, rare, cases). We can now ask, if we are required to satisfy a given probabilistic constraint of the
form µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p, what can be said about the probability that the agent’s belief regarding ϕ when
acting meets the threshold p of the probabilistic constraint? Indeed, we can show that there must be
at least some cases in which belief in the property ϕ is as high as p. More formally:
Lemma 5.1. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let a fact ϕ be local-state independent
of α in T . If µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p, then there must be at least one point (r, t) of T at which α is performed
and (T, r, t) |= βi(ϕ) ≥ p.
Although there must be some points at which βi(ϕ) ≥ p holds when i acts, there is no lower bound
on the measure of runs in which the agent must hold such a strong belief when performing α. It follows
that a probabilistic requirement can be met even when the agent’s degree of belief in the condition ϕ
rarely meets the threshold set by the probabilistic constraint. More formally:
Theorem 5.2. For every ε > 0 and every 0 < p < 1, there exists a pps Tˆ , a proper action α
for i in Tˆ and a fact ϕ which is local-state independent of α in Tˆ such that µTˆ (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p, but
µTˆ
(
βi(ϕ)@α ≥ p
∣∣α) ≤ ε.
The proof of this theorem is obtained by presenting a construction of a pps Tˆ in which α is performed
with beliefs that are slightly below the threshold p in most cases (i.e., whp), and on a small measure
of the runs it is performed when that agent’s belief ascribes probability 1 to the condition ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim under the assumption that 0 < ε < p < 1. So fix such p and ε, and
let Tˆ be the pps corresponding to the following system, depicted in Figure 2: There are two agents, called i
and j. Agent j’s local state contains a binary value called ‘bit’ that does not change over time. There are
two initial global states s0 and s1, with bit = 0 in the state s0 and bit = 1 in s1. Assume that the initial
10
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s1
Figure 2: The pps Tˆ described in the proof of Theorem 5.2
state s1 is chosen with probability p, while s0 is chosen with probability 1− p. In the first round, agent j
acts as follows. If bit = 0 then j sends the message mj to i. If bit = 1 then j’s move is probabilistic;
it sends i the message mj with probability 1− εp , and it sends i a message m′j 6= mj with probability εp .
Agent i receives j’s message at the end of the first round, and then unconditionally performs α at time 1.
We denote by r the run in which bit = 0. Moreover, let r′ denote the run in which bit = 1 and j sends
the message mj, while r
′′ is the run with bit = 1 in which the message m′j is sent.
Let ϕ denote the fact “bit = 1.” The action α is a deterministic action in T since agent i performs
it unconditionally at time 1. Hence, from Lemma 4.3 it follows that ϕ is local-state independent of α
in T . Recall that the value of bit does not change over time, and so ϕ is a fact about runs. Since, by
definition, µT (ϕ) = µT (“bit = 1”) = p and since i performs α in all runs of Tˆ , we clearly have that
µTˆ (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = p. Agent i receives the same message in r and in r′, and so it has the same local state
when it performs α in both r and r′. By definition, it follows that
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r] =
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r′] =
µTˆ (r
′)
µTˆ ({r, r′})
=
p− ε
1− p+ p− ε =
p− ε
1− ε .
By assumption 0 < ε < p < 1, which implies that p−ε1−ε < p. Since i receives the message m
′
j
only in the run r′′, in which bit = 1, we have that
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r′′] = 1, and so r′′ is the only run
in Tˆ for which βi(ϕ)@α ≥ p. We thus obtain that µTˆ (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = µTˆ ({r′, r′′}) = p, while
µTˆ (βi(ϕ)@α ≥ p
∣∣α) = µT (r′′) = ε . The claim follows.
6 Relating Probabilistic Constraints and Expected Beliefs
While Example 1 showed that it is possible to meet a probabilistic constraint while sometimes acting when
the agent’s belief does meet the constraint’s threshold, Theorem 5.2 shows that the threshold can be met
on an arbitrarily small measure of runs. But the proof of Theorem 5.2 suggests that, intuitively, the degree
of belief needs to meet the threshold “on average.” In this section, we prove our main theorem, which
formally captures this intuition. Essentially, we define the expected value of the agent’s degree of belief
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in ϕ when it performs α, and prove that this expected degree must meet the threshold for a probabilistic
constraint to be satisfied. We define the appropriate notion of expectation as follows (cf. [23]):
Definition 6.1. Let α be a proper action for i in a pps T . The expected degree of i’s belief regarding ϕ
when it performs α, denoted by EµT
(
βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α), is:
EµT
(
βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α) , ∑
r∈RT
[
µT (r
∣∣ α) · (βi(ϕ)@α)[r]] .
The expected degree of belief is precisely the expected value of the random variable βi(ϕ)@α,
conditioned on the fact that α is performed at some point in the run.
Our goal is to show that µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) holds for every proper action α. As in
the case of Theorem 4.2, the claim is not true in general. Again, the issue has to do with mixed actions.
For a case in which the claim fails, consider again the system T depicted in Figure 1 and described
in Section 4. In this case, however, take the fact of interest to be ϕ = doesi(α). It is easy to check
that µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = 1, since ϕ holds by definition whenever α is performed. As far as i’s beliefs are
concerned, EµT
(
βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α) = 12 , since i’s local state at the initial global state g0 guarantees that α
will be performed with probability 12 . Hence, µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) 6= EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) in this example. The
source of the problem, as before, is the dependence between ϕ and doesi(α). Fortunately, local-state
independence is, again, all that we need in order to restore order. We can now show:
Theorem 6.2. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T . If ϕ is local-state independent of α in T ,
then
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) . (1)
In a precise sense, Theorem 6.2 provides us with a probabilistic analogue of the knowledge of pre-
conditions principle. The theorem directly implies, in particular, that in order for a system to satisfy
a probabilistic constraint of the form µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p, the expected probabilistic belief in ϕ that agent i
should have when it performs α must be at least p. This is, in fact, a necessary and sufficient
condition on beliefs for satisfying a probabilistic constraint.
6.1 Jeffrey Conditionalization
Theorem 6.2 captures the essence of the connection between probabilistic constraints and probabilistic
beliefs in a purely probabilistic system. Essentially all of our analysis, except for Theorem 5.2, follows
from this result. The probabilistic underpinnings of our results are based on well established connections
between prior and posterior probabilities, since the natural notion of probabilistic beliefs that corresponds
to distributed protocols in a pps T is, as defined in Section 3, in terms of the posterior probability
obtained by conditioning the prior probability µT induced by T on the agent’s local state. Indeed, the
proof of Theorem 6.2 is essentially based on a variant of Jeffrey conditionalization [25], making use of
the properness of the action, and local-state independence of the condition. While a detailed proof is
given in the Appendix, we now briefly discuss some of the elements underlying the proof.4
A basic theorem commonly referred to as Jeffrey conditionalization or the law of total probability,
states roughly that if events X1, . . . ,Xn form a partition of a state space S, and E is an event over S, then
Pr(E) = Pr(X1)·Pr(E |X1) + · · · + Pr(Xn)·Pr(E |Xn) .
One standard interpretation of this is that Pr(E) is the prior probability of E when an experiment is
performed, and X1, . . . ,Xn are its possible outcomes. Then Pr(E|Xi) is the posterior probability of E
4We thank Joe Halpern for suggesting this view of our analysis.
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conditional on observing outcome Xi. This is precisely what is used in Monderer and Samet’s result that
we quoted from [29] (which is not the main contribution of their paper).
A slight generalization of the above property states that if Y is another arbitrary event, then
Pr(E|Y ) = Pr(X1|Y ) · Pr(E|X1 ∩ Y ) + · · · + Pr(Xn|Y ) · Pr(E|Xn ∩ Y ) .
This is the mathematical property underlying Theorem 6.2. The events Xi correspond to the sets of
runs in which the action α is performed at a particular local state `i. The event Y here corresponds
to α — the set of runs in which α is performed.
7 Probable Approximate Knowledge
Theorem 6.2 formally captures the essential connection between beliefs and actions in probabilistic
systems at which probabilistic constraints are satisfied. In particular, it induces a tradeoff between the
degree of belief an agent holds regarding ϕ when it acts, and the probability that it holds such strong
belief. As a corollary of Theorem 6.2 we can show
Theorem 7.1. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let ϕ be local-state independent of α
in T . For all δ, ε ∈ (0,1), if µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ 1− δε then µT(βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε ∣∣α) ≥ 1− δ.
Informally, Theorem 7.1 can be read as stating that if a probabilistic constraint µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p
with threshold p = 1− δε holds, then when the agent acts, she will probably (i.e., w.p. at least 1− δ)
have a strong (i.e., 1− ε) degree of belief that ϕ holds. An especially pleasing form of this result is
obtained when we set δ = ε:
Corollary 7.2. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let ϕ be local-state independent
of α in T . For all ε ≥ 0, if µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ 1− ε2 then µT(βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε ∣∣α) ≥ 1− ε.
Recall that we originally asked to what (probabilistic) extent satisfying a probabilistic constraint
with threshold p required the agent to have a degree of belief that meets the threshold when she acts,
and discovered in Theorem 5.2 that the threshold can be met with arbitrarily small probability. This
corollary provides a positive result, with a slightly relaxed threshold. It implies that in order to satisfy
a constraint with threshold p, the condition ϕ must be believed with degree at least p′ with probability
at least p′ for a value of p′ = 1−√1− p.
We view Corollary 7.2 as showing that in a system T that satisfies a probabilistic constraint with
a threshold p that is sufficiently close to 1, the constraint’s condition ϕ must be probably approximately
known. Recall that the protocol FS in Example 1 satisfies that µ(ϕboth | fireA) ≥ 0.99. Corollary 7.2
implies that in every protocol that satisfies this constraint, the probability that Alice’s degree of
belief that both are firing together when it decides to fire meets or exceeds 0.9 is at least 0.9. In many
distributed problems, the probabilistic constraints impose a much higher threshold than 0.99. If, e.g.,
the threshold for ϕ is exponentially close to 1, then, with extremely high probability, the agent must
have a very strong degree of belief in ϕ when it acts (both exponentially close to 1).
8 Discussion
We have characterized the properties that an agent’s probabilistic beliefs must satisfy when it acts, in order
for its behavior to satisfy a probabilistic constraint that requires a given condition to hold whp when the
agent performs a given action. Our results are not limited to protocols that make explicit reference to the
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agent’s beliefs. They apply to all protocols, deterministic and probabilistic, and to arbitrary probabilistic
constraints (subject to actions being proper and conditions being local-state independent of the actions).
In a precise sense, Theorem 6.2 is the probabilistic analogue of the knowledge of preconditions principle,
which characterizes a fundamental connection between knowledge and action in distributed systems [30].
Just as the KoP has proven useful in the design an analysis of optimal distributed protocols, we expect that
Theorem 6.2 and its future extensions to provide insights and assist in the design of efficient probabilistic
protocols. For a simple example of such an insight, observe that Theorem 6.2 implies that whenever
an agent acts while having a low degree of belief in the desired condition of a probabilistic constraint, she
reduces the probability of success. By refraining from doing so, she can improve her performance. Thus,
for example, even though Alice’s actions guarantee success with probability 0.99 in the FS protocol, she
can satisfy an even more stringent requirement by avoiding to fire when she receives a ‘No’ message from
Bob. The probability that both fire, given that Alice fires, goes up to 0.99899. Moreover, if an agent
never acts when her degree of belief is below the threshold, Theorem 6.2 can be used to establish that
an agent’s actions are optimal with respect to satisfying a probabilistic constraint, given her information.
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A Notations and Observations for the Proofs
Sections of the Appendix are devoted to providing detailed proofs of all technical claims in the paper.
We start by defining notation and stating several observations that will be used in various sections of
the Appendix.
Given an action α ∈ Acti in a pps T , we use Rα to denote event corresponding to the fact α, i.e.,
the set of runs in which α is performed. More formally,
Rα , {r ∈ RT | r |= α} .
Several proofs will partition the event Rα, according to the local states at which i performs the actions.
To this end, we will use Li[α] to denote the set of local states at which i ever performs α. That is,
Li[α] , {`i = ri(t) | (T, r, t) |= doesi(α)} .
For ease of exposition we will use α@`i as shorthand for doesi(α)@`i. By their definition, facts about
runs such as ϕ@`i and α@`i hold only in runs in which agent i’s local state is `i at some point. Sim-
ilarly, (T, r) |= α@`i only if, in particular, (T, r) |= α (that is, only if i performs α in r). We will
make use of the following trivial consequences of these observations to simplify expressions in the
proofs.
Lemma A.1. For all T , r, `i and α, the following equivalences hold.
(a) (T, r) |= (α@`i ⇔ α@`i ∧ `i) ,
(b) (T, r) |= ( [ϕ∧ α]@`i ⇔ [ϕ∧ α]@`i ∧ `i) ,
(c) (T, r) |= ( [ϕ∧ α]@`i ∧ α@`i ⇔ [ϕ∧ α]@`i) ,
(d) (T, r) |= (α@`i ⇔ α@`i ∧ α) , and
(e) (T, r) |= (ϕ@α ⇔ ϕ@α ∧ α) .
The appendix section is organized as follows. We prove Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 in Appendix B
and Appendix C, respectively. Our main result, stated in Theorem 6.2, is proved in Appendix D, and is
used to prove the later theorems and lemmas. Lemma 5.1 is proved in Appendix E. Finally, Theorem 7.1
and Corollary 7.2 are proved in Appendix F.
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B Proving Theorem 4.2
Roughly speaking, Theorem 4.2 shows that if a protocol ensures that actions be taken only when belief
meets the threshold of a probabilistic constraint, then the probabilistic constraint will be satisfied. This
is true, however, only if the constraint’s condition and its action satisfy local-state independence. Before
proving the theorem, we prove a lemma showing that local-state independence guarantees that roughly
speaking, the probability that ϕ holds at a point at which i’s local state is in Li[α] is independent of
whether α is performed at that state. This is where the independence property is used in the proof of
Theorem 4.2. More formally:
Lemma B.1. Let α be a proper action for i in T , and let ϕ be local-state independent of doesi(α) in T .
Then for each `i ∈ Li[α],
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α@`i) = µT (ϕ@`i ∣∣ `i) . (1)
Proof. We first define a partition on the set of runs in which ϕ occurs when α is performed. For every
local state ` ∈ Li[α], we denote Q`ϕ = {r| (T, r) |= [ϕ ∧ α]@` }. Thus, Q`ϕ is the set of runs in which
both ϕ holds and α is performed when i’s local state is `. Moreover, define Π′ = {Q`ϕ | ` ∈ Li[α]}.
Fix a local state `i ∈ Li[α]. Clearly, Π′ partitions the set of runs satisfying ϕ@α, and so the left-hand
side of (1) satisfies:
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α@`i) = ∑
`′i∈Li[α]
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`′i
∣∣α@`i) . (2)
By assumption, α is a proper action, hence there exists no run r ∈ RT for which both (T, r) |= α@`i and
(T, r) |= α@`′i for `′i 6= `i. It follows that µT
(
[ϕ∧α]@`′i
∣∣α@`i) = 0 for each `′i 6= `i, and so the right-hand
side of (2) satisfies: ∑
`′i∈Li[α]
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`′i
∣∣α@`i) = µT([ϕ∧ α]@`i ∣∣α@`i) . (3)
From the definition of conditional probability we obtain that the right-hand side of (3) satisfies:
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
∣∣α@`i) = µT([ϕ∧ α]@`i ∧ α@`i)
µT (α@`i)
. (4)
From Lemma A.1(c) it follows that µT
(
[ϕ ∧ α]@`i ∧ α@`i
)
= µT
(
[ϕ ∧ α]@`i
)
. By multiplying the
right-hand side of (4) by
µT (`i)
µT (`i)
= 1, we obtain:
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i ∧ α@`i
)
µT (α@`i)
=
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
)
µT (`i)
· µT (`i)
µT (α@`i)
. (5)
From Lemma A.1(b) Lemma A.1(a) and by the definition of conditional probability we obtain that the
right-hand side of (5) satisfies:
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
)
µT (`i)
· µT (`i)
µT (α@`i)
=
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
∣∣ `i)
µT (α@`i
∣∣ `i) . (6)
By assumption, ϕ is local-state independent of α in T , and so the right-hand side of (6) satisfies:
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
∣∣ `i)
µT (α@`i
∣∣ `i) = µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣ `i)
µT (α@`i
∣∣ `i) = µT (ϕ@`i ∣∣ `i) . (7)
17
We are now ready to prove:
Theorem 4.2. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let ϕ be a fact that is local-state
independent of α in T . If βi(ϕ) ≥ p at every point of T at which i performs α, then µT (ϕ@α |α) ≥ p.
Proof. Recall that Rα , {r ∈ RT | r |= α} and Li[α] , {`i = ri(t) | (T, r, t) |= doesi(α)}. Moreover,
we use α@`i as shorthand for doesi(α)@`i. For every `i ∈ Li[α], let Q`i = {r| (T, r) |= α@`i}, and let
Π = {Q`i|`i ∈ Li[α]}. We claim that Π is a partition of Rα. Every set Q`i ∈ Π is nonempty since by
the definition `i ∈ Li[α] and so there is at least one run of RT in which `i appears as a local state of i.
By definition,
⋃
`i∈Li[α]
Q`i = Rα since for every r ∈ RT we have that r ∈ Rα iff i performs α at some
point in r, which is true iff i performs α at a local state of Li[α] at some point (r, t) of r. Finally, the
intersection of any two sets Q`i and Q`
′
i for `i, `
′
i ∈ Li[α] such that `i 6= `′i is empty since, by assumption,
α is performed at most once in any run of RT . Thus, Π is a partition of Rα.
Since Π = {Q`i|`i ∈ Li[α]} is a partition of Rα, we can use the law of total probability to obtain:
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = ∑
`i∈Li[α]
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α@`i ∧ α) · µT (α@`i ∣∣α). (8)
From Lemma A.1(d) it follows that
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α@`i ∧ α) = µT (ϕ@α ∣∣α@`i)
for every `i ∈ Li[α]. It follows that the right-hand side of (8) equals:∑
`i∈Li[α]
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α@`i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣α) . (9)
Fix `i ∈ Li[α]. By definition of Li[α] there exists a point (r, t) ∈ Pts(T) such that (T, r, t) |= doesi(α),
and `i = ri(t). By assumption we have that (T, r, t) |= βi(ϕ) ≥ p, which implies by definition of βi that
µT (ϕ@`i | `i) ≥ p. Moreover, by Lemma B.1, it follows that µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α@`i) ≥ p. Since this is true for
every `i ∈ Li[α], we thus obtain that:
(9) ≥ p ·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
µT (α@`i |α) = p · 1 = p .
It follows that µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p as required.
C Proving Lemma 4.3
We recall Lemma 4.3:
Lemma 4.3 Let α ∈ Acti be a proper action in a pps T , and let ϕ be a fact over T . If (a) α is
deterministic in T , or (b) ϕ is past-based in T , then ϕ is local-state independent of α in T .
Proof. We Prove each condition separately:
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Case (a): α is a deterministic action in T . Fix ϕ and an action α satsfying the assumptions, and
a local state `i ∈ Li[α]. Since α is a deterministic proper action for i, the fact α@`i either holds for every
run that satisfies `i (i.e., for every run in which `i appears), or holds for none of them.
- If α@`i holds for every run that satisfies `i then, for every r ∈ RT we have both that
(T, r) |= α@`i ⇔ `i, and that (T, r) |=
(
[ϕ@`i ⇔ [ϕ∧ α]@`i
)
. We thus obtain that µT (α@`i
∣∣`i) = 1,
and that µT
(
ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) = µT([ϕ∧ α]@`i ∣∣ `i).
- Otherwise, α@`i holds at none of the runs that satisfies `i. In this case we have for all runs r ∈ RT
that both (T, r) |= ¬(α@`i) ⇔ `i, and (T, r) |=
( ¬( [ϕ∧α]@`i) ⇔ ϕ@`i ). We thus have that both
µT (α@`i
∣∣`i) = 0, and µT( [ϕ∧ α]@`i ∣∣ `i) = 0.
In either case µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣`i) = µT([ϕ∧ α]@`i ∣∣`i), establishing local-state independence.
Case (b): ϕ is a past-based fact in T . Fix `i ∈ Li[α], and let p = µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i), thus p denotes
the probability that ϕ holds when i’s local state is `i given that i’s local state is `i at some point of the
run. Since ϕ is a past-based fact in T , for each node v of T either ϕ holds at any point (r, t) such that
r passes through v at time t or ϕ does not hold at any such point.
Since i’s protocol Pi is a (possibly probabilistic) function of its local state, the probability that
i performs α is the same at all points at which its local state is `i. Hence, the conditional probability that
i performs α when its local state is `i given that i’s local state is `i at some point of the run, denoted
µT (α@`i
∣∣`i), is fixed by the protocol. It follows that µT( [ϕ∧ α]@`i ∣∣ `i) is the probability of reaching
a node v at which ϕ holds and then choosing a run in which i performs α at v. By the analysis above
it equals µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣`i), and the claim follows.
D Proving the Expectation Theorem
The expectation theorem is our main result, and the proofs of other claims, including Lemma 5.1, easily
follow as its corollaries. It is stated as follows:
Theorem 6.2. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T . If ϕ is local-state independent of α in T ,
then
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) . (1)
Proof. We will transform the right hand side of Equation (1) into the left hand side. Recall that Rα is the
set of runs of T in which i performs the action α. Since µT (r | α) = 0 for each run r /∈ Rα, the expected
degree of i’s belief in ϕ when it performs a proper action α (given that i performs α) can be expressed by:
EµT (βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α) = ∑
r∈Rα
[
µT (r
∣∣ α) · (βi(ϕ)@α)[r]] . (10)
Recall that Li[α] = {`i = ri(t) | (T, r, t) |= doesi(α)} for every α ∈ Acti, and Q`i = {r| (T, r) |= α@`i}
for every `i ∈ Li[α]. Moreover, Π = {Q`i | `i ∈ Li[α]} is a partition of Rα. The rhs of Equation (10) can
thus be reformulated as: ∑
`i∈Li[α]
∑
r∈Q`i
[
µT (r |α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
. (11)
Since α is a proper action, and so if (T, r) |= α@`i for a local state `i ∈ Li[α], then
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r] =
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i). Moreover, µT (ϕ@`i ∣∣ `i) is guaranteed to be well defined since by definition of Li[α], for
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each `i ∈ Li[α] there must be a run r such that (T, r) |= `i, where µT assigns positive measure to every
run of RT , and so µT (`i) > 0 for each `i ∈ Li[α]. We can therefore rewrite Equation (11) to obtain:∑
`i∈Li[α]
∑
r∈Q`i
[
µT (r |α) · µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i)] . (12)
Since µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) is a constant given that r ∈ Q`i, an equivalent form of (12) is:∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) ·∑
r∈Q`i
µT (r |α)
]
. (13)
The inner summation is performed over the conditional probabilities of the distinct runs whose union
is Q`i, and thus equals µT (α@`i |α). Equation (13) can thus be rewritten as:∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i |α)
]
. (14)
Applying the definition of conditional probability to the right element of each summand, Equation (14)
becomes:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∧ α)
]
. (15)
By Lemma A.1(d) we can rewrite the right element of each summand in (15) to obtain:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i)
]
. (16)
Recall that µT (`i) > 0 for `i ∈ Li[α]. We multiply each summand in Equation (16) by µT (`i)µT (`i) = 1 and
obtain:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i)µT (`i) · µT (`i)
]
. (17)
By Lemma A.1(a) and from the definition of conditional probability we rewrite the second element of
each summand to obtain:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣`i) · µT (`i)
]
. (18)
Since ϕ is local-state independent of α in T , we have by Theorem 4.1 that µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i) · µT (α@`i ∣∣`i) =
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
∣∣`i). Hence, we can simplify Equation (18) into:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
∣∣`i) · µT (`i)
]
. (19)
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By Lemma A.1(b) and the definition of conditional probability we obtain:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
)]
. (20)
Recall that Q`iϕ is the set of runs in which both ϕ holds and α is performed when i’s local state is `i.
By definition, we have that µT (Q
`i
ϕ) = µT
(
[ϕ∧ α]@`i
)
, and so we can transform Equation (20) into:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
`i∈Li[α]
[
µT (Q
`i
ϕ)
]
. (21)
Define Π′ , {Q`iϕ | `i ∈ Li[α]}. Clearly, Π′ is a partition of the runs satisfying ϕ@α. We can therefore
rewrite Equation (21) as:
1
µT (α)
·
∑
Q
`i
ϕ∈Π′
[
µT (Q
`i
ϕ)
]
. (22)
Since Π′ is a partition of the runs satisfying ϕ@α, we can further rewrite Equation (22) into:
1
µT (α)
· µT
(
ϕ@α
)
. (23)
From Lemma A.1(e) and the definition of conditional probability, the expression in (23) equals µT
(
ϕ@α
∣∣α).
It follows that
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) ,
as claimed.
E Proving Lemma 5.1
We recall Lemma 5.1:
Lemma 5.1 Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let a fact ϕ be local-state independent
of α in T . If µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ p, then there must be at least one point (r, t) of T at which α is performed
and (T, r, t) |= βi(ϕ) ≥ p.
Proof. We prove the counterpositive. Recall Equation (10):
EµT (βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α) =∑
r∈Rα
[
µT (r |α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
Begin with the right-hand side of (10) and assume that βi(ϕ) < p whenever i performs α, thus:∑
r∈Rα
[
µT (r |α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
<
∑
r∈Rα
[
µT (r |α) · p
]
= p ·
∑
r∈Rα
µT (r |α) = p .
Hence, EµT (βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α) < p. Recall from Theorem 6.2 that
µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) ,
and so if βi(ϕ) < p whenever i performs α, then µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) < p . The claim follows.
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F Proving Theorem 7.1 and Corollary 7.2
We now turn to proving Theorem 7.1 and Corollary 7.2, which show, roughly, that if ϕ is guaranteed
to hold whp when i performs α, then the agent must probably approximately know that ϕ holds when it
performs α. We start by proving Lemma F.1, which essentially establishes the claim when the threshold
probability is 1. In this case, under our model assumptions, if ϕ must hold when i performs an action α,
then whenever i acts it must know that ϕ currently holds. This claim is stated formally in Lemma F.1,
which closely corresponds to the claim made by KoP:
Lemma F.1. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let a fact ϕ be local-state independent
of α in T . If µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) = 1 then µT(βi(ϕ)@α = 1 ∣∣α) = 1.
Proof. We prove the counterpositive. Recall that Q`i = {r| (T, r) |= α@`i} for every `i ∈ Li[α], and that
Π = {Q`i | `i ∈ Li[α]} is a partition of Rα. From (12) we obtain:
µT (ϕ@α |α) =
∑
`i∈Li[α]
∑
r∈Q`i
[
µT (r |α) · µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i)] .
Assume that there exists a run r ∈ Rα in which i’s belief in ϕ when it performs α is smaller
than 1, i.e.,
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r] < 1. Then there exists a point (r, t) ∈ Pts(T) at which i performs α, but
(T, r, t) |= βi(ϕ) < 1. For the state `i = ri(t) we obtain by definition of βi(ϕ) that µT (ϕ@`i | `i) < 1.
Thus: ∑
`i∈Li[α]
∑
r∈Q`i
[
µT (r |α) · µT (ϕ@`i
∣∣ `i)] < ∑
`i∈Li[α]
∑
r∈Q`i
[
µT (r |α) · 1
]
. (24)
Since Π is a partition of Rα, the right-hand side of (24) equals:∑
r∈Rα
[
µT (r |α)
]
= 1 .
It follows that if there exists a run r ∈ Rα such that i’s belief in ϕ when it performs α is smaller than 1,
then µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) < 1. This establishes the counterpositive claim, and completes the proof.
Theorem 7.1. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let ϕ be local-state independent of α
in T . For all δ, ε ∈ (0,1), if µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ 1− δε then µT(βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε ∣∣α) ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. Recall that Rα denotes the set of runs in which i performs α. First note that if
(
βi(ϕ)@α |α
)
[r] ≥
1 − ε for all r ∈ Rα, then µT
(
βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1 − ε
∣∣α) = 1 ≥ 1 − δ, and we are done. From
here on, the proof will be performed under the assumption that the set of runs r ∈ Rα for which(
βi(ϕ)@α |α
)
[r] < 1− ε is not empty (and thus has positive probability).
Equation (10) states the following:
EµT
(
βi(ϕ)@α |α
)
=
∑
r∈Rα
[
µT (r | α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
.
We can partition the runs of Rα into ones in which βi(ϕ) < 1− ε when i performs α, and ones in which
βi(ϕ) ≥ 1−ε there. Since ϕ and α are fixed throughout the proof, we will use the following shorthands for
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ease of exposition. We denote by R<1−ε the set of runs of Rα for which (βi(ϕ)@α) < 1− ε; similarly, we
use R≥1−ε to denote the set of runs of Rα for which (βi(ϕ)@α) ≥ 1−ε. Thus (10) can be reformulated as:
EµT
(
βi(ϕ)@α |α
)
=∑
r∈R<1−ε
[
µT (r | α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
+
∑
r∈R≥1−ε
[
µT (r | α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
. (25)
We remark that in runs in which βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε, agent i’s belief is upper bounded by 1. In addition,
recall that, by assumption, R<1−ε is not an empty set. Hence, the right-hand side of (25) satisfies:∑
r∈R<1−ε
[
µT (r | α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
+
∑
r∈R≥1−ε
[
µT (r | α) ·
(
βi(ϕ)@α
)
[r]
]
<
(1− ε) · µT
(
βi(ϕ)@α < 1− ε |α
)
+ 1 · µT
(
βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε |α
)
.
(26)
We will prove the counterpositive. Assume that µT
(
βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1 − ε |α
)
< 1 − δ. Thus, for
some δ′ > δ, µT
(
βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε |α
)
= 1− δ′ , and the probability µT
(
βi(ϕ)@α < 1− ε |α
)
of the
complementary event is δ′. It follows that:
(26) = (1− ε) · δ′ + 1 · (1− δ′) = 1− εδ′ .
By assumption, δ′ > δ and so EµT (βi(ϕ)@α
∣∣α) < 1− εδ′ < 1− εδ. By Theorem 6.2 we obtain
that µT
(
ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α). We thus obtain that:
µT
(
ϕ@α
∣∣α) = EµT (βi(ϕ)@α ∣∣α) < 1− εδ .
It thus follows that if µT
(
ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ 1− εδ, then µT(βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε |α) ≥ 1− δ.
We are now ready to prove:
Corollary 7.2. Let α be a proper action for agent i in a pps T , and let ϕ be local-state independent
of α in T . For all ε ≥ 0, if µT (ϕ@α
∣∣α) ≥ 1− ε2 then µT(βi(ϕ)@α ≥ 1− ε ∣∣α) ≥ 1− ε.
Proof. The case of ε = 0 is simply Lemma F.1. For ε = 1 the claim follows from the fact that µT is a
probability measure. Finally, for 0 < ε < 1, the claim is an instance of Theorem 7.1 obtained by setting
δ = ε.
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